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Rethinking the Rational Animal 
The Question of Anthropologocentrism in Heidegger, Bergson, and Zen 
Bret W. DAVIS 
I fear that the animals consider humans to be beings of their same kind, who have lost, in a 
most dangerous manner, their sound animal common sense [den gesunden Tierverstan<fJ . 
-Nietzsche, Die fröhliche Wissenscha/i1 
With all eyes the creature beholds 
the Open. Only our eyes, 
as though reversed, encircle it on every side 
as traps set round their unobstructed path to freedom. 
What is outside, we know from the animal's 
face alone„. 
-Rilke, Duineser Elegien2 
For Rilke, human 'consciousness,' 'reason,' logos, is precisely the limitation that makes human 
being less capable than the animal. Are we then supposed to turn into 'animals'? ... Because he 
has the word, human being, and he alone, is the being who looks into [hineinsieht] the Open .... 
The animal. on the contrary, does not directly see the Open, never does, not with a single one 
of all its eyes. 
-Heidegger, Parmenides3 
In a tradition that runs from Aristotle through Heidegger, the human has 
been defined as the being capable of logos, a capacity which is thought to radically 
distinguish us from and elevate us above all (other) animals. The chirps, growls, 
and cries of the beasts, Descartes assures us, can in no way be compared to 
human being's power of rational linguistic thought and expression.4 Yet this 
dominant tradition of anthropologocentrism has been repeatedly called into question 
in modern times. After Darwin (who wrote: "There is no fundamental difference 
between man and the higher animals in their mental faculties"5) and the more 
recent "cognitive ethologists,"6 and after Nietzsche7 and other late modern and 
postmodern thinkers, the issue of what distinguishes "man from beast" has once 
again been adorned with a question mark. 
Various Western philosophers and phenomenologists have attempted to 
grapple anew with the question of animality /humanity. In this essay I shall 
consider two: Heidegger and Bergson. Heidegger is interesting in this regard for 
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his radical attempt to reinstate an abysmal distinction between the human and the 
animal, even though-or precisely because-he himself thoroughly criticizes the 
rationalistic tradition of humanism. Bergson's "creative evolution," on the other 
hand, while reiterating in its own manner a kind of anthropocentrism, concedes a 
certain superiority to animals. An instinctual nearness to the flow of life is said to 
give them an important advantage over against human intellectual abstraction from 
the concrete and heterogeneous movement of qualitative time. 
While Heidegger's closeness to East Asian thought is often recognized, in 
this case it is Bergson who invites comparison with Zen's critique of abstract 
intellection and call for a return to a more spontaneous non-dualistic way of being-
in-the-world. In the final part of this essay, 1 shall show how a critical rethinking 
of the Western determination of human being as the "rational animal" can be aided 
by a dialogue with this non-Western tradition,8 a tradition which locates human 
authenticity quite differently in a breakthrough of abstract logos and dualistic 
rationality. 
Heidegger's Logocentric Humans and World-Poor Anirnals 
Aristotle's definition of human being as "the animal who has logos" (zfion 
logon echon), which later gets translated into the more familiar Latin phrase 
animal rationale, both connects us with and separates us from (other) animals. 
Aristotle argued that plants, animals and humans all have an animating principle of 
life which he calls the "soul" (psyche). He divides this soul into various parts, a 
division which, he says, "enables us to classify animals." This classification takes 
place by observing that "some animals possess all these parts of soul, some certain 
of them only, others one only."9 Thus plants would have only the "vegetative" or 
"nutritive" soul, animals in addition the "appetitive" soul, and only human beings 
the "rational" soul, that is, "the power of thinking" (dianoetikon) and "intelligence" 
(nous).10 Human beings alone are said to "possess reasoning [logismon] and thought 
[dianoian]," 11 and they alone share with the gods the activity of "contemplation" 
(thefiria). 
This distinction of "having logos" underlies the mainstream an:thropo-
logocentrism of the Western philosophical tradition, and this tradition-despite the 
imaginative objections of Romanticism, Nietzsche's retrieval of the pre-Socratic 
Dionysian side of the Greek experience of life, and Derrida's deconstructions of 
"carno-phallologocentrism"12-continues to heavily influence the way we view the 
world, including our presumptions of an abysmal separation between spiritual 
humanity and embodied animality. 
Heidegger is an interesting philosopher in the regard; for precisely when he 
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deconstructs the representational metaphysics of the West, he reinscribes and 
insists on an "abyss which separates humans from animals." In fact, Heidegger 
will radicalize this abyss, targeting the latinized Aristotelian notion of animal 
rationale as the metaphysical conception of human being that must be overcome. 
In an attempt to retrieve a more originary sense of "logos" as a "gathering" 
(legein) that, rather than manipulating things according to universal laws of nature, 
would let beings show themselves from themselves, he reiterates the assertion that 
logos is the exclusive and defining characteristic of human being. While severely 
criticizing the Enlightenment tradition of "humanism," Heidegger himself proffers a 
kind of "higher humanism" which grants to human being (as Da-sein) a central role 
in the "worlding of the world" (namely as the "guardian of the clearing of Being"). 
Heidegger's critique of humanism does not steer us in the direction of reaffirming 
our natural link with animals, but rather in the opposite direction. Thus, in his 
"Letter on 'Humanism,'" we find Heidegger repeating, rather than leaving behind, a 
metaphysical aspiration to the divine and away from bodily entanglement with 
animals. 
Of all the beings that are, presumably the most difficult to think about are living 
beings [das Lebe-Wesen], because on the one hand they are in a certain way most 
closely akin to us, and on the other they are at the same time separated from our 
ek-sistent essence by an abyss. However, it might also seem as though the 
essence of divinity is closer to us than what is so alien in other living beings, 
closer, namely, in an essential distance that, however distant, is nonetheless more 
familiar to our ek-sistent essence than is our scarcely conceivable, abysmal bodily 
kinship with the animal.13 
While occasionally repeating such remarks in connection with his emphatic critique 
of the notion of animal rationale, Heidegger himself takes up in detail the difficult 
task of thinking the essence of animality only once, in a long section of a 1929-30 
lecture course entitled The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. In this first and 
only extensive consideration of animal life, Heidegger concludes that only humans 
are "world-forming" (weltbildend), for we alone are linguistically open to the Being 
of beings. Ambiguously-and for Heidegger disturbingly-situated between world-
forming humans and worldless stones, animals are said to be, at best, "poor in 
world" (weltarm).14 
A few years later, in less developed but even harsher comments, Heidegger 
claims that the "animal has no world," because world is always "spiritual world," 
nor has it in the true sense even any "environment" (Umwelt). 15 The term 
"world" comes to mean for Heidegger the Open as the clearing of Being wherein 
beings come to show themselves. "Human being, and he alone," Heidegger claims, 
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"sees into the Open„„ The animal, on the contrary, does not glimpse or see into „. 
the Open in the sense of the unconcealedness of the unconcealed."16 The animal is 
open to the world only in the restricted sense of behavior (Benehmen) as 
"captivation" (Benommenheit); the animal, being "absorbed in itself," is excluded 
from the manifestness of beings.17 Because human being "has the word," among all 
beings he alone is capable of seeing into the Being of beings. This linguistically 
aided capacity to "see into" (hineinsehen) the Open is said to be what "forms the 
insurmountable essential boundary between animal and human."18 
One might have expected Heidegger-as a critic of "humanism" and of the 
metaphysically reductive scientific world-view, as a thinker who early on sought to 
ground abstract theory in concrete being-in-the-world, and as one who later wrote 
of the poetic work arising out of and returning to a more primordial silence-to be 
more sympathetic to the idea of an original nearness of human existence to animal 
"life." In fact, in one single passage in the course of 200 pages of trenchant 
clarification of the elusive abyss which separates us from animals, Heidegger 
concedes that "the animal's poverty in world „. is nonetheless a kind of wealth," 
that animal "life is a domain which possesses a wealth of openness with which the 
human world may have nothing to compare."19 
Nevertheless, even though "humans can sink lower than any animal,"20 they 
are also uniquely capable of seeing into the Open and of bringing the Being of 
beings to expression. One wonders whether it may be precisely because 
Heidegger wishes to speak at the end of these 200 pages of "a return to the pre-
logical manifestness of beings,"21 that he feit compelled first to lay out in detail 
what this did not mean, namely, a return to animality. His break with the 
tradition inaugurated in part by Aristotle did not mean calling into question the 
abyss between the human and the animal; it meant rather rethinking and indeed 
reinforcing it. In any case, having made his point in this text, Heidegger never 
again takes up in any detail the question of animality, other than to periodically 
reiterate his assertion of an abysmal distinction between it and the humanity of 
Dasein.22 
While early on clearly influenced by Bergson's thought, Heidegger later 
rejects all such Lebensphilosophie as still bound to the metaphysical 
misunderstanding of human being as the rational animal. (He sees Nietzsche as 
having merely overturned the traditional emphasis on human rationality to accord 
priority to the animality of the rational animal.23) The question of "life" is, for 
Heidegger, inextricably intertwined with the question of the animal, and neither for 
him is central to the exclusively human task of thinking. Bergson, on the other 
hand, takes up the relation of humans to animals as a philosophical question par 
excellence, and it is for him only by way of understanding animality that we can 
understand humanity. We shall find that Bergson's theory of "creative evolution" 
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is most interesting in the context of rethinking the rational animal, both for its 
critique of and for its continuity with the tradition of anthropologocentrism. 
Moreover, his notion of "intuition," which attempts to go beyond intellection and 
recover, in a properly human manner, the immediacy of instinct, opens the way to 
a dialogue with Zen. 
Bergson's Creative Evolution: Instinct, Intellection, and Intuition 
In his first major work, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate 
Data of Consciousness, Bergson's speaks out against the spacialization of fluid time, 
the quantification of qualitative difference, and the way that "language requires us 
to establish between our ideas the same sharp and precise distinctions, the same 
discontinuity, as between material objects."24 Through this critique Bergson sought 
to reawaken a sense for the inner freedom of the etan vital, to return us to an 
intuition of the duree pure of creative time. The "superficial self" of intellection 
and linguistic sociality, akin to what Heidegger calls das Man, comes to cover up 
that fundamental self in touch with his or her inner freedom, a freedom which 
springs from an intimate connection to the vital impulse of life itself. Thus one 
finds around the fundamental self a "parasitic self" whose linguistic deposits and 
social habits leave a crust that keeps one from experiencing one's inner freedom.25 
The generalities of language and communal life arise out of and exacerbate our 
obsession with making everything the same, an obsession which Bergson depicts as 
a kind of self-defense mechanism, "a reaction against that heterogeneity which is 
the very ground of our experience."26 
Other animals are said to not be victims/perpetrators of this homogenizing 
space; they do not reduce the many shades of singular quality to a "pure 
geometrical form." Nor do animals mistake temporal duration for "materialized 
time that has become quantity by being set out in space."27 Animals do not, 
Bergson writes, "picture to themselves ... as we do, an external world quite distinct 
from themselves,"28 but rather act spontaneously in a more originary spacial and 
temporal heterogeneity. 
And yet, despite the advantage that animal instinct is accorded over human 
intellection in these occasional remarks in Time and Free Will, there is another 
side to Bergson's thought, as is revealed in the following passage from his last 
major work, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion: "W e regard intelligence as 
[man's] main characteristic, and we know that there is no superiority which 
intelligence cannot confer on us, no inferiority for which it cannot compensate."29 Is 
this not traditional anthropocentric intellectualism all over again? Not quite. For 
even if Bergson does, in the end, reiterate a quasi-teleological anthropocentric 
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hierarchy of life, it is ultimately neither the sociability of the "political animal" nor 
the logos of intelligence that makes it possible for humans alone to break out of 
their "closed" circle of existence. For Bergson, an intuitive reconnection with the 
greater flow of the elan vital, with "naturing Nature," can only take place by way 
of what Deleuze calls "creative emotion."30 
lt may not, in the final analysis, be possible to completely iron out all the 
wrinkles in Bergson's highly ambivalent attitude toward "intelligence," that is, 
toward conscious intellectual thought. A dynamic tension between dualities is 
indeed a pattern that runs throughout Bergson's writings; such dualities include 
quality/quantity, time/space, mind/matter, and finally open/closed (moralities and 
religions). One major duality that runs through his works-the one most pertinent 
with respect to the question of animality-is that of instinct/intelligence. In 
contrast to the above listed pairs, however, there is not always a clear order of 
priority expressed here. What we must try to understand is, in John Mullarkey 
words: "Bergson's ambivalence towards the value of instinct and animality-at times 
closest to life, at other times closer to the lifeless. "31 If there is in the end a 
resolution to this tension in Bergson's thought, it is to be found, as we shall see, in 
a third term that he adds to this pair: "intuition." 
In order to appreciate both Bergson's praise and his criticism of intelligence 
(conscious reflection), we must understand these in the context of the key 
structuring idea of his thought: "creative evolution." This notion does not imply, 
Bergson tells us, a unidirectional teleology, but points rather to a movement 
propelled by the tension between two opposed yet intertwined forces. Thus, even 
though Bergson will speak of "a sudden leap from the animal to man," such that 
the latter "might be considered the reason for the existence of the entire 
organization of life on our planet," there is in reality, he cautions, "only a current 
of existence and the opposite current,"32 only a push toward conscious life and a 
pull back toward inert matter. The dialectical dynamic between life and its lifeless 
deposits explodes out simultaneously in countless directions; and it is only by 
chance that it has "gone the farthest" in the form of human being. 
But what does Bergson mean by "farthest" here? What sacrifices have we 
made, and what is the direction of our possible further advancement? He writes: 
lt is as if a vague and formless being, whom we may call, as we will, man or 
superman, had sought to realize himself, and had succeeded only by abandoning a 
Part of himself on the way. The losses are represented by the rest of the animal 
world, and even by the vegetable world .... 33 
What are the losses represented by the animals? In a word: the immediacy of 
instinct. What animals reveal to us is that even "reflection itself, the secret of 
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man's strength, might look like weakness, for it is the source of indecision, whereas 
the reaction of an animal, when it is truly instinctive, is instantaneous and 
unfailing. "34 
Thus, according to Bergson, "instinct and intelligence imply two radically 
different kinds of knowledge."35 What, first of all, does he understand by instinct or 
instinctual action? Just as he links intellection with conscious thought, Bergson 
understands instinct to be a matter of "unconsciousness." But here he marks a 
crucial difference between two types of unconsciousness, namely: 
that in which consciousness is absent, and that in which consciousness is 
nullified„.. The unconsciousness of a falling stone is of the former kind. [The 
second occurs when we so directly act that] the representation of the act is held 
in check by the performance of the act itself, which resembles the idea so 
perfectly, and fits it so exactly, that consciousness is unable to find room 
between them. Representation is stopped up by action .... The inadequacy of act to 
representation is precisely what we here call consciousness. [In other words,] 
consciousness is the light that plays around the zone of possible actions.... lt 
signifies hesitation or choice.36 
The latter sense of unconsciousness, where the animal (human or otherwise) acts 
in such unison with its surroundings that there is no gap for the hesitancy of the 
conscious and ultimately self-conscious seif to creep in and take over, reminds one 
of what Zen calls "no-mind" (mushin), an idea that we shall examine below. 
According to Bergson, a conscious distance from reality is both the blessing 
and the curse of thinking beings. Conscious representational thought, "in shaping 
itself into intelligence," has enabled we humans to "objectively" move among 
external objects, "evading the barriers they oppose to [us], thus opening to 
[ourselves] an unlimited field."37 But this abstract objectification ambivalently both 
makes possible a transcendence of subjective enclosure and provides the ego with 
a powerful tool for self-centered manipulation of the world. While abstraction from 
the here and now allows us a "momentary slackening of the attachment to life," it 
ultimately "cannot be relied on to keep up this selflessness," for in the end 
intelligence "would more likely council egoism."38 
The contemporary Zen philosopher Ueda Shizuteru writes of a similar 
ambivalence with regard to human being: The unique trait of homo erectus, namely 
to stand upright on two legs, both freed the hands for the manipulation of tools 
and raised the head horizontally parallel to the ground so that one has the world 
"objectively" in view. This bipedal stance enables hoth the openness and the 
egocentrism of human beings; at one and the same time a horizontal "world-view" 
opens us up to the horizon of the encircling world and yet centers that world, 
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either as "present-" or "ready-to-hand," on our very ego. Zen meditation abandons 
momentarily the "elevated superiority" of our bipedal stance and returns one to a 
sitting posture, with legs entwined and empty hands folded, granting one the 
opportunity to stand up once again in a more originary (re)opening to the world 
and to others on a centerless field of "interdependent origination."39 
Staying with Bergson for the moment: On the one hand, conscious 
intellection has enabled us to free ourselves from the environment; on the other 
hand, it has estranged us from the world. On the one hand, abstract and spacial 
thought has made possible a technological control over much of our lives; on the 
other hand, this objectification saps the life, the elan vital, out of everything it 
touches. Instinct, on the contrary, stays in tauch with, if also bound to, this greater 
flow of life. Indeed, Bergson writes that "intelligence and instinct are turned in 
opposite directions, the former towards inert matter, and the latter towards life."40 
Thus Bergson, who despite all the optimism of his creative evolution does 
not begin with a Leibnizian confidence that this is the best of all possible worlds, 
at one point sighs: "lf the force immanent in life were an unlimited force, it might 
perhaps have developed instinct and intelligence together, and to any extent, in the 
same organisms."41 The tone of Bergson's thought is, nevertheless, on the whole 
exceedingly positive, and although there can be no simple return to animal instinct 
(nor should there be), he posits a third term which would reunite the opposition of 
consciousness and life, a higher kind of instinctual knowing, namely, intuition. Just 
as "there subsisted around animal instinct a fringe of intelligence," he says, "so 
human intelligence preserved a halo of intuition."42 Although we gain a hint of 
the immediacy of this intuition from the animals, in fact "intuition had to debase 
itself to become instinct," and what we are after is thus something greater, not a 
mere return to animality. 
Although human consciousness, according to Bergson, is preeminently 
intellect, he suggests that it "might have been, it ought, so it seems, to have been 
also intuition." "A complete and perfect humanity," he writes, "would be that in 
which these two forms of conscious activity should attain their full development."43 
Having followed the path of reflection far enough (perhaps too far), the task now 
is to "awaken the potentialities of intuition which still slumber within 
[intelligence]."44 Bergson defines this higher intuition as "instinct that has become 
disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it 
indefinitely."45 
For all his criticism of abstract and spacializing consciousness, then, in the 
end Bergson sees it as performing a vital role in the process of creative evolution; 
once it is reunited with instinct, both the limits of intellectualism and those of 
animality can be overcome. Because of his potential for this intuitive reunification, 
according to Bergson, "man comes to occupy a privileged place. Between him and 
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the animals the difference is no langer one of degree, but one of kind."46 
Nevertheless, we present human beings have hardly achieved this intuitive return. 
"In the humanity of which we are a part, intuition is, in fact, almost completely 
sacrificed to intellect." For us, intuition is "a lamp almost extinguished, which only 
glimmers now and then, for a few moments at most."47 
Ultimately Bergson will turn to mysticism, not of the contemplative sort, but 
that of "action, creation, love." Our task is to reconnect with the etan vital of life, 
a connection that has been severed in abstract reflection, by way of "turning back 
for fresh impetus," not through intelligence, but in the opposite direction: through 
intuition. All around intelligence, Bergson tells us, "there lingers still a fringe of 
intuition, vague and evanescent." And thus he urges: "Can we not fasten upon it, 
intensify it, and above all, consummate it in action„.?"48 
Curiously, Bergson argues that Buddhism attained only the penultimate stage 
in the mystical "effort at oneness with the creative impetus," claiming that it stops 
"half-way, dangling all dizzy in the void between two activities, between the human 
life it has left behind and the divine life it has not yet reached."49 Like so many 
Western thinkers of this time period, following in the footsteps of Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche before them, Bergson's familiarity with Buddhism seems to have 
been largely restricted to a partial image of the "Arhants" of the Indian Theravada 
tradition, and he judged what he knew to "lack warmth and glow," to be ignorant 
of "the complete and mysterious gift of the seif," and to not "believe in the efficacy 
of action."50 What would he have had to say with regard to the Compassionate 
Light of Amitabha, or the Buddha-nature that dwells both equally and uniquely 
within each singular one of us, or with regard to the Zen identification of satori 
with a wholehearted engagement in everyday activity? 
Zen and the Intuitive Activity of No-Mind 
Bergson's criticism of the Western tradition of intellectualism, and his 
attempt to return to a more direct experience of life, resonate in a number of 
ways with Zen. The "anti-intellectual" stance of Zen is well known in the West, no 
doubt because its Eastern representatives have often emphasized this aspect in 
contrast to a Western bias toward abstract intellection. lt is D. T. Suzuki, 
particularly in his early writings, that is chiefly responsible for impressing upon 
Western minds the limits of intellection according to Zen. He writes: "The warst 
enemy of Zen experience, at least in the beginning, is the intellect, which consists 
and insists in discriminating subject from object," and the first purpose of the kßan 
exercise is thus "to make the calculating mind die."51 What is left once one has 
succeeded in thoroughly suspending the calculating mind, he says, is what the Zen 
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masters have called "no-mind" (mushin) or "no-thought" (munen). 
In order to ward off a knee jerk reaction to this anti-intellectualism, we 
should add to these terms what Dogen, following Yüeh-shan Wei-yen (Yakusan 
!gen), calls "non-thinking" (hi-shiryo). This non-thinking is said to be neither 
"(calculating) thought" (shiryo) nor simply a negation of thinking (fu-shiryo), but to 
involve rather a wisdom that "transcends thought and yet appears in thought."52 
The banishment of all intellection; then, would not be the "goal" of Zen meditation, 
but only a temporary interruption, a step on the way towards overcoming the 
kind of conceptual thinking based on dualistic discrimination. Ultimately, however, 
as demonstrated particularly in higher levels of koan training, zazen would open 
the door to a different "non-dual" way of thinking.53 
What then does it mean to dwell in a state of no-mind or, as Suzuki 
sometimes translates it, "Unconsciousness"? Suzuki cites famous Zen masters who 
describe their state of awakening as a matter of: "When I feel sleepy, I sleep; 
when I want to sit, I sit"; or again: "In summer we seek a cool place; when it is 
cold we sit by a fire." A novice monk at this point asks: "That is what other 
people do; is their way the same as yours?" The master replies that it is not the 
same, for "when they eat, they do not just eat, they conjure up all kinds of 
imagination; when they sleep, they do not just sleep, they are given up to varieties 
of idle thoughts." 54 
But here is our question: Does this intuitively natural living suggest a kind 
of return to animality? What is the difference between these "everyday acts ... 
done naturally, instinctively, effortlessly, and unconsciously"55 and the instinctual 
behavior of animals? 
There are, to be sure, analogical references to animals in this regard to be 
found in Zen texts. Suzuki himself quotes elsewhere Ta-hui who describes the 
moment of satori as one where you feel "like a lion roaming about freely with 
nobody disturbing him, or like an elephant that crosses a stream not minding its 
swift current."56 And we could refer to other passages from important Zen texts 
such as the Zazengi, which uses animal analogies to speak of the homecoming 
experience of seeing into one's original nature: "it is like a dragon obtaining water; 
like a lion abiding in the mountains."57 
Suzuki quotes a passage from Bodhidharma that would, in fact, seem to 
suggest a certain equivalence here: 
lt is like the bee sucking the flower, like the sparrow pecking at grains, like 
cattle feeding on beans, like the horse grazing in the field; when your mind is 
free from the idea of private possession, all goes weil with you.58 
The context of this passage is the question of ethical responsibility and the idea of 
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overcoming even the moral dualism of "good and bad, just and unjust." Rather 
shockingly, Suzuki claims that in the state of no-mind "you · behave like the wind, 
and who blames the wind when it leaves havoc in its wake?"59 "But," he goes on 
to add, "[ethical] laws are like the wind too." The state of no-mind would thus 
presumably entail carrying out moral imperatives as spontaneously and as naturally 
as eating when one is hungry. 
What precisely, however, is the relation of human no-mind to animal instinct 
and to inorganic phenomena like fire and wind? In a Japanese text on the topic 
of no-mind, Suzuki treats this issue directly and in some detail.60 He begins by 
contrasting the freedom of fire and wind with the dualistic discrimination which 
plagues human consciousness, and proceeds to raise the question of whether this 
means that the ideal of no-mind entails abandoning the human mind, becoming 
insentient (mujo) and acting like the physical forces of nature. This, he concludes 
however, is in the end neither possible nor desirable for humans. Next, he 
considers "animal no-mind" as exemplified by instinctual behavior. Much as a fire 
indiscriminately both brings warmth to and burns down a home, so does a lion 
unhesitatingly both protect its young and devour an unlucky passerby. Both the 
no-mind of natural forces and that of instinct driven animals, different as they are 
in other respects, share this unhesitating spontaneity in contrast with our own 
dualistic deliberations. 
While we have much to learn from the no-mind of animal instinct, this is 
not, Suzuki clearly states, to be equated with "human no-mind." Discriminatory 
consciousness is both the · blessing and the curse of humanity; on the one hand, it 
is the source of our culture, our ethics, our science and philosophy-in short, our 
"values"; on the other hand, it is the root of our alienation from one another and 
from nature, as well as of our egoistic treatment of that which we project as 
other. The task, then, is not simply to return to instinctual no-mind; or rather, 
this return is not to be thought of as a simple one. Suzuki writes that "the 
question is to what degree we can bring the no-mind that exists within instinct 
into the human world, and to what degree we must let this instinctual no-mind act 
within this world-for in the midst of this very contradiction [between the no-mind 
of instinct and the human world] lies the road forward for our spiritual life."61 
Human mind (ningenteki ushin) steps out of and overcomes the no-mind of 
instinct; and yet, "it is necessary now to return this mind once more to the world 
of no-mind. To 'return' here means to overcome the contradiction of the fact that 
[in order to attain true no-mind] it was necessary for human mind to step out of 
instinctual unconsciousness and non-teleological no-mind."62 To overcome this 
contradiction, however, is not a single act, but rather a matter of learning to live 
dynamically within this tension, to dwell in the "no-mind of the contradiction just 
as it is" (mujun no mama no mushin). 
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On first consideration it appears that no-mind is equivalent to affirming instinct. 
While in one aspect this is indeed the case, nevertheless that which has an 
infinite meaning-something that is not to be sensed within the animal no-mind 
up to this point-only arises by way of adding to instinct the discipline of the 
human conscious mind. To live this 'meaning of no-meaning' is what is called 
the life of no-mind.63 
What would it mean to live within this contradiction of thought (meaning) and 
instinct? 
Moving according to animal instinct, and yet adding on top of this human mind 
(ningenteki ushin); then by neither relying on instinct nor stopping at [human] 
mind, by walking forth between being (u) and nothingness (mu), or rather by 
walking in that place where both of these are no longer to be found; this is 
where I wish to recognize what is called human no-mind (ningenteki mushin).64 
Suzuki's "return to no-mind" is not a retreat from the human world of 
thought and values; but neither does it simply reaffirm this world. Transcending 
the world while living in its very midst is, of course, nothing other that the life of 
a Bodhisattva, and this life is depicted here as one of released engagement in our 
human world of values and discriminatory thought, without, however, abandoning 
the quasi-instinctual (i.e., intuitive) spontaneity of no-mind. 
Despite Suzuki's claim that we have much to learn from animals (as well as 
from wind and fire) in our journey towards recovering a properly human no-mind, 
he does not council a simple return to animality. In fact, he reproduces a quasi-
hierarchical model of progression from the mechanical world through the world of 
instinct to the ethical world of duty and valuation, and finally to the religious 
world where no-mind would be recovered without abandoning the world of mind.65 
The "return to no-mind" would in the end lead forward into a critically attuned 
yet spontaneously intuitive engagement in our human (if often "all too human") 
world of values and discriminatory thought. 
Many a philosopher will no doubt persist in finding fault with Zen for not 
having given the positive potentials of human reasoning their full due. Or, 
conversely, one might point out how Zen's own prolific writings (goroku) draw as 
much on the textual and "intellectual" traditions of Buddhism as do these, in turn, 
receive inspiration from the meditational practice of "stepping back from words 
and letters." Moreover, consideration must be given to the fact that part of the · 
Buddhist heritage that Zen takes over-albeit in its own demythologizing and 
deconstructive style-is the mythos of transmigration through the "six realms of 
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existence," a cos.rp.ology with its own distinct versions of an anthropocentric 
hierarchy and a derogatory view of animals. Zen too, therefore, would need to 
respond more fully to the contemporary critique of anthropologocentrism, a critique 
that positively revives the very question of the intertwined yet distinct essences of 
animality and humanity.66 In any case, as we have seen, Zen promises to be an 
engaging dialogue partner in our ongoing attempts to rethink the rational animal of 
the West. 
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